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Reply to Miriam Baer and Michael 
Doucette’s Reviews of Two Models of 
Pre-Plea Discovery in Criminal Cases 
Jenia I. Turner* & Allison D. Redlich** 
The comments by Michael Doucette1 and Miriam Baer2 to our 
recent article about pre-plea discovery in Virginia and North 
Carolina suggest that our findings have generated interest 
among practitioners and other scholars. This is encouraging to 
us. But we take this opportunity to respond to Doucette and Baer 
for two reasons. First, although our article already addressed in 
considerable detail the methodological concerns that Doucette 
and Baer raise, we want to briefly restate that discussion here, to 
prevent confusion among readers who have not read our original 
article. Second, we are compelled to respond to several points by 
Doucette that reflect a misunderstanding of our findings and our 
arguments and to note several places in which he 
mischaracterizes those findings and arguments. We conclude by 
embracing the call for further research by Baer. 
As Baer notes, our survey fills an important gap in the 
literature on criminal discovery, which has largely lacked 
empirical grounding and has often focused on trial discovery 
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 1. Doucette labels his piece “Virginia Prosecutors’ Response,” uses the 
collective pronoun “we” throughout, and states that his comments are “on behalf 
of Virginia’s prosecutors.” See generally Michael R. Doucette, Virginia 
Prosecutors’ Response to Two Models of Pre-Plea Discovery in Criminal Cases: 
An Empirical Comparison, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 415, 416 (2016). 
However, he does not explain whether and in what sense his piece represents 
the views of all Virginia prosecutors and does not explain which other 
prosecutors, if any, have contributed to his response. Therefore, we attribute his 
reply to him individually.  
 2. Miriam H. Baer, Some Skepticism about Criminal Discovery 
Empiricism, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 347 (2016). 
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rather than discovery before a guilty plea.3 While welcoming this 
empirical approach, Baer raises some concerns about 
methodology, focusing above all on the response rate to the 
survey.4 Doucette likewise criticizes the response rate, but has 
other concerns about our methods as well.  
We begin with Doucette’s first criticism—that we examined 
perceptions of discovery rather than discovery practices directly.5 
We acknowledged this in our article. Indeed, this was the whole 
point of our project: rather than engaging in a theoretical 
discussion of proper discovery practices—an exercise that has 
been ably accomplished elsewhere—we sought to examine the 
subjective perceptions of actual practitioners on both sides. We 
believe this perspective to be important and largely missing from 
existing scholarship on the issue.6 As we explained, “defense 
attorneys and prosecutors are the key actors in discovery and 
have first-hand experience with most of its effects. Their views 
and perceptions therefore offer an indicator of what really 
happens at this critical stage of the criminal process.”7 The 
reliance on perceptions by those directly engaged in the process 
being studied is a well-recognized research method of social 
scientists.8 Further, a key objective of our survey was to assess 
the advantages and disadvantages of open-file discovery 
practices. In analyzing this question, the reported experience of 
those who are familiar with such policies (North Carolina) and 
those who are less so (Virginia) is undoubtedly relevant.  
                                                                                                     
 3. See id. at 348.  
 4. See id. at 353. 
 5. Doucette, supra note 1, at 416.  
 6. See Baer, supra note 2, at 348 (“They [Turner and Redlich] employ a 
survey-based empirical approach that has been largely missing in this debate.”).  
 7. Jenia I. Turner & Allison D. Redlich, Two Models of Pre-Plea Discovery 
in Criminal Cases: An Empirical Comparison, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 285, 315 
(2016). 
 8. Surveys are among the most common research design methods. See, 
e.g., Fred N. Kerlinger & Howard B. Lee, FOUNDATIONS OF BEHAVIORAL 
RESEARCH 600 (4th ed. 2000) 
Survey research is considered to be a branch of social scientific 
research . . . . Its procedures and methods have been developed 
mostly by psychologists, sociologists, economists, political scientists, 
and statisticians. . . . The social scientific nature of survey research is 
revealed by the nature of its variables, which can be classified as 
sociological facts, opinions, and attitudes. 
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We are not the only ones to have sought the perspectives of 
practicing attorneys in evaluating the merits of open-file 
discovery. For example, the Supreme Court of Virginia itself 
relied heavily on public comments by prosecutors and defense 
attorneys when studying the need and desirability of discovery 
reform in Virginia.9 Indeed, as then-President of the Virginia 
Association of Commonwealth’s Attorneys, in 2012, Doucette 
contributed a public comment to the court, relying for his 
argument entirely on the perceptions and experiences of himself 
and other prosecutors.10 Consideration of such commentary is 
routine for public decision-making bodies throughout the United 
States, even when it is gathered and received in far less 
systematic fashion than were our survey responses.11  
Relatedly, Doucette also suggested that using the word 
“empirical” in our article title was a misnomer, stating that this 
term “connotes that the scientific method was used.”12 Doucette 
conflates these two terms. “Empirical” simply means “based on, 
concerned with, or verifiable by observation or experience rather 
than theory or pure logic.”13 Our survey most certainly collected 
                                                                                                     
 9. See Doucette, supra note 1, at 426 (citing order by Supreme Court of 
Virginia indicating that the Court considered public comments in its 
consideration of discovery reform proposals); see also SUPREME COURT OF VA., 
REP. OF THE SPEC. COMM. ON CRIMINAL DISCOVERY RULES TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE & 
JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF VA. xv (Dec. 2, 2014). 
 10. See Letter from Michael Doucette, President, Va. Ass’n of 
Commonwealth Att’y, Public Comment Concerning Proposed Rule Change to 
Wit: Virginia Rule of Court 3A:11 (Discovery and Inspection: Criminal) at 4 
(Dec. 12, 2012) (opposing open-file by noting witness safety concerns and 
pointing as evidence that “[o]ne Virginia prosecutor abandoned his practice of 
providing a copy of everything in his file to the defense when he learned that 
copies of the materials thus provided were being passed around at meetings of 
the Bloods street gang”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see 
also id. (asserting, without any evidentiary support, that “[t]he collection, 
processing and indexing of materials and other related workload increases, 
which would be required by this version of 3A:11, would significantly impair the 
productivity and reduce the services provided by any offices”).  
 11. More questionably, in his response to our article, Doucette effectively 
substitutes his own anecdotal perceptions of the costs and benefits of open-file 
for those of hundreds of criminal justice practitioners from Virginia and North 
Carolina who participated in our study. Doucette, supra note 1, at 427–32.  
 12. Id. at 416. 
 13. Empirical, ENGLISH OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES, 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/empirical (last visited Nov. 16, 2016) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Empirical, OXFORD 
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data (experiences), and it sought information about what is was 
happening in the real world, in the opinions of the actors closest 
to the process. It was not based on theory or pure logic. Our title 
was accurate.   
Notably, our article does not simply compare the perceptions 
of Virginia defense attorneys to those of Virginia prosecutors. 
Instead, much of it focuses on the comparative experiences of 
Virginia prosecutors and North Carolina prosecutors—
specifically, the fact that North Carolina prosecutors report a 
significantly higher rate of pre-plea disclosure of most categories 
of evidence. Therefore, Doucette’s point that defense counsel may 
not always know what evidence a prosecutor withholds (an issue 
we also address in the article) does not undercut the findings of 
our study.  
Next, both Doucette and Baer express a concern that our 
sample is not representative and that our response rate is low. 
We addressed this issue directly in our article: 
Like most surveys of this nature, our sample is non-
representative, as we did not randomly select individuals to 
participate, and persons self-selected to examine and complete 
the survey. Although we attempted to reach out broadly to the 
populations of attorneys in Virginia and North Carolina, our 
results may not generalize to all attorneys in these states 
because of the non-representativeness of our sample. 
Nonetheless, our response rates and our completion rate of 
75% are quite comparable to, or exceed, rates from similar 
surveys.14 
Baer points to the low response rate as an argument for 
supplementing our survey with more empirical studies, 
employing different methods and studying additional 
jurisdictions.15 But Doucette takes this argument a step further 
and claims that the low response rate renders our study invalid.16 
While we agree with Baer about the need for further research, we 
                                                                                                     
ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) (defining empirical as a study “[t]hat pursues 
knowledge by means of direct observation, investigation, or experiment (as 
distinct from deductive reasoning, abstract theorizing, or speculation)”). 
 14. Turner & Redlich, supra note 7, at 321.  
 15. See Baer, supra note 2, at 358 (stating Baer’s hope that others will 
continue to study open-file’s “effect on criminal justice”).  
 16. See Doucette, supra note 1, at 420. 
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take issue with Doucette’s claim that the low response rate 
invalidates our findings. 
 Although one might always wish for a higher response rate, 
ours was similar to or higher than those obtained in other studies 
of prosecutors and defense attorneys.17 Indeed, we believe our 
survey to be the most comprehensive to date of the perceptions of 
prosecutors and defense attorneys about discovery issues. There 
are several reasons for this: 1) the response rate was higher than 
those of two of the three other discovery-related surveys;18 2) our 
                                                                                                     
 17.  For example, in a study surveying defense attorneys about their choices 
in guilty plea contexts, Vanessa Edkins had an eleven percent response rate in 
the first round of surveys sent (national sample) and a fourteen percent 
response rate in the second round (Florida sample). See Vanessa A. Edkins, 
Defense Attorney Plea Recommendations and Client Race: Does Zealous 
Representation Apply Equally to All?, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 413, 417 (2011) 
(addressing the role of the defense attorney and examining whether disparities 
in sentence length and incarceration rates between African Americans and 
Caucasian Americans are in part due to the plea bargains that defense 
attorneys recommend to these clients to accept). Similarly, Kathy Pezdek and 
Matthew O’Brien surveyed defense attorneys and prosecutors in California and, 
in discussing their low response rate, commented that “[a]nyone doing research 
with practicing attorneys is aware of the difficulty getting them to participate.” 
Kathy Pezdek & Matthew O’Brien, Plea Bargaining and Appraisals of 
Eyewitness Evidence by Prosecutors and Defense Attorneys, 20 PSYCHOL., CRIME 
& L. 222, 237 (2014).  
 18.  See TEX. CRIM. DEF. LAWYERS ASS’N & MANAGING TO EXCELLENCE CORP., 
THE COST OF COMPLIANCE: A LOOK AT THE FISCAL IMPACT AND PROCESS CHANGES 
OF THE MICHAEL MORTON ACT 4 (2015) [hereinafter TCDLA REPORT ON MICHAEL 
MORTON ACT] (showing participation at around eight percent and using a non-
random sample); see also N.Y. CTY. LAWYERS’ ASS’N, DISCOVERY IN NEW YORK 
CRIMINAL COURTS: SURVEY REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (2006) (using a non-
random sample and noting that 750 surveys were mailed, and 131 responses 
were used to write the report, resulting in a seventeen and one half percent 
response rate, although it is unclear whether this percentage included only 
completed surveys, or partially-completed surveys as well). An exception to this 
is the survey conducted by the Federal Judicial Center. Although it was also a 
non-random sample, it received responses from thirty-one percent of private 
defense attorneys and forty-seven percent of public defenders, forty-eight 
percent of active district judges, and ninety-one percent of U.S. Attorney’s 
offices. An important limitation of the survey was that it did not survey 
individual prosecutors, but collected responses from an office as a whole. 
Furthermore, it was limited to one jurisdiction—the federal system—and only 
asked about disclosure of Brady evidence pre-trial, rather than about discovery 
practices more broadly, including pre-plea. LAURAL HOOPER ET AL., A SUMMARY 
OF RESPONSES TO A NATIONAL SURVEY OF RULE 16 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND DISCLOSURE PRACTICES IN CRIMINAL CASES: FINAL 
REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL RULES 8 (2011). 
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survey studied prosecutors as well as defense attorneys, unlike 
some surveys, which focus on defense attorneys only;19 and 3) it is 
the only survey that directly compared the experiences of 
practitioners in two states with different rules, thereby including 
a prosecutor-to-prosecutor comparison across states, rather than 
simply comparing prosecutors to defense attorneys.20 
Doucette takes his critique further, claiming that we “did not 
attempt to collect data from a representative sample,”21 that we 
“made no effort to make sure [our] sample was representative,”22 
and that we “intended that respondents to the survey self-
select.”23 These statements are simply false. As one of the 120 
Commonwealth Attorneys in Virginia, Mr. Doucette was in the 
group whom we contacted for participation and advice on 
conducting our survey.24 We therefore regret to see that he did 
not appreciate the many efforts we undertook to maximize the 
size and representativeness of our sample. We contacted several 
statewide associations with a request to obtain the names and 
emails of all Virginia and North Carolina prosecutors so that we 
could directly recruit the population of prosecutors in these states 
and obtain a random sample. But no association was able or 
willing to provide us with such a list. It was only then that we 
turned to the survey method described in the article.  
As our article documents, we attempted to reach the broadest 
possible selection of attorneys and obtain the highest possible 
response rate. We did so by: 1) keeping our survey relatively 
                                                                                                     
 19.  See N.Y. CTY. LAWYERS’ ASS’N, supra note 18, at 7. Two of the studies 
did survey both prosecutors and defense attorneys (and judges), but they 
examined only one jurisdiction—Texas and the federal system, respectively. 
Moreover, the study of the federal system did not address pre-plea discovery and 
only asked about disclosure of Brady evidence pre-trial. See TCDLA REPORT ON 
MICHAEL MORTON ACT, supra note 18, at iv–v (examining the Texas criminal 
justice system exclusively); see also HOOPER ET AL., supra note 18, at 1–2 
(examining views about pretrial Brady disclosure in the federal criminal justice 
system). 
 20.  See HOOPER ET AL., supra note 18, at 1–2 (focusing exclusively on the 
federal jurisdiction); see also N.Y. CTY. LAWYERS’ ASS’N, supra note 18, at 7 
(studying New York City exclusively); see also TCDLA REPORT ON MICHAEL 
MORTON ACT, supra note 18, at iv–v (focusing exclusively on Texas). 
 21.  Doucette, supra note 1, at 417 (emphasis added). 
 22.  Id. at 419 (emphasis added). 
 23.  Id. at 418 (emphasis added). 
 24. See Turner & Redlich, supra note 7, at 317. 
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short; 2) keeping the survey confidential; 3) sending repeated 
reminders to our contacts; and 4) in the case of prosecutors, 
contacting them in two ways—through statewide associations of 
prosecutors (who in turn sent our solicitation to prosecutors 
throughout the state) and through individual chief prosecutors 
(whom we asked to send our survey to their staff prosecutors).25 
We note here that Doucette claims that we “asked elected 
prosecutors in Virginia . . . to help them identify assistants in 
their own office who would also participate,” and thereby accuses 
us of “snowball sampling.”26 This is inaccurate. We did not ask 
chief prosecutors to selectively identify other assistants in their 
office to participate, but instead requested that they send the 
survey to all prosecutors in their offices.27  
Doucette (but not Baer) also finds fault with our comparative 
approach. He claims that North Carolina and Virginia are not 
sufficiently legally alike to be worth comparing.28 Scholars of 
comparative law are likely to find this criticism startling, as 
comparative law typically studies legal systems that are much 
more dissimilar than those of North Carolina and Virginia. More 
to the point, Doucette’s criticism is unsupported. He mentions 
several legal differences between Virginia and North Carolina, 
but fails to describe how any of them have any bearing on 
discovery practices. For example, he mentions that Virginia has 
jury sentencing, while North Carolina does not; and that judges 
in Virginia are appointed, while those in North Carolina are 
elected.29 He does not explain why either jury sentencing or 
judicial selection has any direct or significant relationship to 
discovery practice. In fact, evidence from other states suggests 
that there is no such relationship. For example Texas has jury 
sentencing, like Virginia, but it is an open-file state, like North 
Carolina, undermining Doucette’s implication that jury 
sentencing somehow stands in the way of open-file.30 The same 
                                                                                                     
 25.  Id. at 316–18. 
 26.  Doucette, supra note 1, at 418. 
 27.  Turner & Redlich, supra note 7, at 317. 
 28.  See Doucette, supra note 1, at 420–21. 
 29.  Id. at 421. 
 30.  See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 37.07 (providing defendants with the 
right to have a jury assess the punishment); see also id. art. 39.14 (mandating 
open-file discovery). 
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goes for appointed judges—like Virginia, Colorado has appointed 
judges, yet that state has open-file discovery, suggesting that the 
appointment of judges does not prevent the flourishing of liberal 
discovery rules.31  
We next highlight several places in which Doucette’s 
response seriously mischaracterizes our methods and findings. 
Doucette first claims that “the article never tells us what is 
meant by ‘open file’ discovery.”32 In fact, we do explain our use of 
this term, both in the survey instrument and in the article. In the 
survey, we define open-file as “a system under which the 
defendant has access to the entire prosecutorial file, except for 
attorney work product and information exempt from disclosure by 
a protective order.”33 In the article, we provide further detail, and 
would here refer the reader to the four-page section II(B), entitled 
“Beyond the Baseline: Two Models of Discovery in Criminal 
Cases.”34 There we explain the wide spectrum of disclosure 
requirements that vary from state to state, and note that we have 
identified seventeen states that can be understood to follow an 
“open-file” model.35 As we wrote: 
While states that follow this [open-file] model differ somewhat 
in the scope of information they require to be disclosed, the 
chief characteristics of their discovery rules are similar. The 
prosecution is generally required to disclose, at some point 
after arraignment, either its entire case file (minus work 
product) or a broad set of evidentiary materials that 
encompasses nearly everything in the file (minus work 
product). The key feature of such liberal discovery is that it 
presumptively requires the disclosure of witness names, 
witness statements, and police reports.36 
Appendix B to our article also contained tables showing the many 
specific differences among discovery rules in the fifty states, 
including variations in timing requirements and disclosure of 
                                                                                                     
 31.  See COLO. CONST. art. VI, §§ 20, 24 (providing for the appointment of 
judges). But cf. id. § 25 (providing for retention elections); see also COLO. R. 
CRIM. PROC. 16 (mandating open-file discovery). 
 32.  Doucette, supra note 1, at 422.  
 33.  Turner & Redlich, supra note 7, at 305. 
 34.  Id. at 302–06. 
 35.  Id.  
 36.  Id. at 303. 
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witness names, witness statements, and police reports.37 In short, 
our survey and our article did not fail to explain terminology. 
Doucette also asserts that we “do not include the survey 
given to defense attorneys” and we “do not explain that 
omission.”38 In fact, we explain in the article that “[t]he defense 
attorney survey (not reproduced here) was largely the same, 
although the questions were rephrased to ask about what defense 
attorneys believed to be prosecutors’ practices of disclosure in 
their jurisdiction.”39 Because the prosecutor and defense surveys 
were nearly identical, apart from this different phrasing of the 
questions which acknowledges that defense attorneys receive, 
rather than disclose the evidence we were asking about, it would 
have been duplicative to include both surveys (each of which was 
fourteen pages long) in our article.40 
Next, Doucette inaccurately asserts that “[i]n North 
Carolina, prosecutors reported significantly lower rates of 
disclosure than Virginia prosecutors.”41 It appears that Doucette 
misunderstood the conclusions of our survey. In fact, the opposite 
was true: across most categories, North Carolina prosecutors 
reported significantly higher rates of disclosure than their 
Virginia counterparts.42 As we explain in the article, this is true 
with respect to the pre-plea disclosure of critical items such as co-
defendants’ statements, witness names, witness statements, 
materials related to identification procedures, and police 
reports.43 Contrary to Doucette’s claim, “[t]he difference is 
statistically significant when we compare the responses of 
Virginia and North Carolina prosecutors as well as the responses 
of defense attorneys from each state.”44   
                                                                                                     
 37.  See id. Appendix B (displaying the “Table of Select Discovery Rules by 
Jurisdiction”). 
 38. Doucette, supra note 1, at 416. 
 39. Turner & Redlich, supra note 7, at 316 n.141. 
 40.  Id. 
 41. Doucette, supra note 1, at 425. 
 42.  See, e.g., Turner & Redlich, supra note 7, Table 2a (showing the 
statistical difference between North Carolina’s and Virginia’s rates of disclosure 
as reported by prosecutors in felony cases). 
 43. Id. at 325. 
 44. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Perhaps this fundamental misunderstanding of our findings 
contributes to Doucette’s claim that we “carry an inherent bias” 
in favor of defense attorneys.45 Doucette bases his claim about our 
alleged bias—a term he uses repeatedly and, in our view, 
insupportably—on two key points: 1) our lack of personal law 
enforcement experience;46 and 2) our interpretation of certain 
responses by Virginia prosecutors, which he claims we 
characterize as misleading.47 Doucette states that because we 
“are not practicing lawyers and have no experience in law 
enforcement, [our] apparent bias causes [us] to make . . . biased 
conclusions that are not based in fact or evidence.”48 We note here 
that we are neither prosecutors nor defense attorneys, and 
therefore, by definition have no professional bias with respect to 
either. If anything, our lack of a direct stake in the outcome of 
discovery reform debates makes us more objective than those who 
are “engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out 
crime.”49 We leave to the reader’s judgment whether Doucette’s 
own role as a prosecutor50 and past role as head of the Virginia 
Association of Commonwealth’s Attorneys51 leaves him more or 
less vulnerable to the kinds of biases of which he accuses us. We 
do note that our survey suggests that his apparent skepticism 
about certain aspects of open-file discovery is not shared by most 
prosecutors in North Carolina, or by most defense attorneys in 
either state.52 
To address Doucette’s more specific accusations, nowhere in 
the article do we suggest that “prosecutors provided misleading 
                                                                                                     
 45.  Doucette, supra note 1, at 424. 
 46.  Id. at 425. 
 47.  See id. at 424 (“[T]he authors suggest that prosecutors provided 
misleading responses and therefore discount some of the data collected by their 
survey.”). 
 48.  Id. at 425. 
 49.  See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (explaining why, 
as a rule, a neutral and detached magistrate should review probable cause 
determinations underlying searches and seizures by law enforcement agents). 
 50. See Doucette, supra note 1, at 415 (describing Michael Doucette’s 
current job as the “Commonwealth’s Attorney, City of Lynchburg”).   
 51.  Letter from Michael Doucette, President, Va. Ass’n of Commonwealth 
Att’y, supra note 10. 
 52.  Turner & Redlich, supra note 7, at 359–72. 
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responses,”53 and we never “openly dismiss reports from 
prosecutors as being false.”54 Doucette specifically objects to our 
statement that “consciously or unconsciously, some Virginia 
prosecutors may have been eager to show that they are disclosing 
Brady material at high rates and that there is no pressing need 
for reforming the rules.”55 This statement does not express 
disbelief in the prosecutors’ responses. Rather, it develops one of 
several explanations as to why, with respect to disclosure of 
certain Brady evidence, Virginia prosecutors are reporting 
similar or somewhat higher rates of disclosure than their North 
Carolina prosecutors.56 Because these responses departed from 
the overall pattern we found when comparing the pre-plea 
disclosure rates of North Carolina and Virginia prosecutors,57 we 
put forth several plausible interpretations,58 including the one 
that Doucette perceives as “biased.”59 It should hardly be 
controversial to suggest that one’s views about an issue might 
have been affected by having entered the fray as an advocate. 
Given the heavy advocacy by prosecutors against discovery 
reform through public comments to the Virginia Supreme Court 
in the year before our study was conducted, 60 we believe that this 
is a plausible interpretation of the finding..  
Doucette also incorrectly asserts that we “openly dismiss 
reports from prosecutors [about witness safety concerns] as being 
false.”61 In fact, our article quotes in full the two responses by 
Virginia prosecutors we received that referenced specific cases of 
witness intimidation or assaults following disclosure of witness-
                                                                                                     
 53.  Doucette, supra note 1, at 424. 
 54.  Id. at 425.  
 55.  Id. at 424 (citing Turner & Redlich, supra note 7, at 337). 
 56.  See Turner & Redlich, supra note 7, at Table 3a.  
 57.  See Id. Table 2a. 
 58.  Id. at 333–38.  
 59.  See id. at 424 (“Because the issue was so politically sensitive at the 
time . . . consciously or unconsciously, some Virginia prosecutors may have been 
eager to show that they are disclosing Brady material at high rates and that 
there is no pressing need for reforming the rules.”).  
 60.  See, e.g., Virginia Ass’n of Commonwealth’s Attorneys (VACA), Public 
Comment on the Report of the Special Committee on Criminal Discovery Rules, 
June 29, 2015 [hereinafter 2015 VACA Letter] (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 61.  Doucette, supra note 1, at 425. 
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related information.62 Nowhere do we suggest that these reports 
are untrue or irrelevant. We do note the fact that in North 
Carolina, prosecutors rarely reference witness intimidation and 
assaults as a major disadvantage of open-file.63 As we point out, 
“of the six [North Carolina] prosecutors who identified witness 
intimidation as a major disadvantage of open-file, only three gave 
more specific responses” and none of these responses directly 
stated that open-file led to an assault to witnesses.64 When we 
later comment on the risk of witness intimidation, we note that 
“[a]lthough a number of Virginia prosecutors feared this 
consequence of open-file and had even experienced it, neither 
North Carolina prosecutors nor North Carolina defense attorneys 
identified witness safety as a significant concern.”65 In short, far 
from “openly dismiss[ing]” reports from Virginia prosecutors 
about witness threats, we directly acknowledge them. And while 
we note that North Carolina practitioners do not perceive witness 
safety to be a significant risk of open-file discovery, we conclude 
our article by calling for further empirical study of this 
question.66 It should go without saying that we agree that 
concerns about witness safety and witness intimidation are 
always important in our justice system. Indeed, every open-file 
discovery system of which we are aware, including North 
Carolina’s, provides for special measures designed to protect 
witness safety.67 In North Carolina, for example, prosecutors do 
not need to disclose the identity of confidential informants68 
                                                                                                     
 62.  Turner & Redlich, supra note 7, at 359.  
 63.  See id. (“By contrast, only 10.3% (6 out of 58) of North Carolina 
prosecutors believed that witness intimidation was a significant disadvantage of 
open-file discovery.”). 
 64.  One respondent said that he “had one case where retaliation occurred. 
A ‘snitch’ was able to be identified by the information in the file and he was 
later beaten up. I don’t know if that outcome would have been any different if I 
had waited to give discovery out, but I doubt it.” Turner & Redlich, supra note 7, 
at 360 (citing Jenia I. Turner & Allison D. Redlich, Pre-Plea Discovery Practices: 
A Survey of North Carolina Prosecutors, Question No. 19, Respondent No. 62 
(2014)).  
 65.  Id. at 383 (emphasis added). 
 66.  See id. at 384 (“[F]urther empirical study, surveying witnesses 
themselves, would be the optimal means of assessing the actual effects of open-
file on witness intimidation.”). 
 67.  Id. at 304. 
 68.  See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 15A-904(a1) (West 2011) (providing that 
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(other than as required under Brady) and prosecutors can request 
that the court issue a protective order to prevent the disclosure of 
witness information that might jeopardize the witness’s safety.69 
In his thoughts about where discovery reform is heading, 
Doucette also discusses his own experience serving on the 
Virginia Supreme Court Special Committee on Criminal 
Discovery Rules. That Committee recommended “broader and 
earlier discovery,”70 but the Virginia Supreme Court rejected the 
recommendation, which was opposed by law enforcement 
groups.71 Doucette criticizes the Committee for not distinguishing 
between statute- or rule-based discovery and constitutionally-
mandated exculpatory evidence.72 He notes that wrongful 
convictions have occurred only when prosecutors failed to disclose 
exculpatory evidence.73 From this, he concludes that there is no 
need to require discovery beyond what Brady v. Maryland74 
already requires.75 Here, he ignores two critical points relevant to 
discovery reform.  
                                                                                                     
prosecutors are “not required to disclose the identity of a confidential informant 
unless the disclosure is otherwise required by law”).  
 69.  See id. § 15A-908(a) (“Upon written motion of a party . . . the court may 
at any time order that discovery or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, 
or may make other appropriate orders.”); see also id. § 15-903(a3) (“Names of 
witnesses shall not be subject to disclosure if the prosecuting attorney certifies 
in writing and under seal to the court that to do so may subject the witnesses or 
others to physical or substantial economic harm or coercion, or that there is 
other particularized, compelling need not to disclose.”).  
 70. Doucette, supra note 1, at 426.  
 71.  See Tom Jackman, Virginia Decides Not To Change Rules That 
Withhold Documents From Defense, WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/va-decides-not-to-change-
rules-that-withhold-documents-from-defense/2015/12/12/6f76d982-9dc5-11e5-
bce4-708fe33e3288_story.html (last visited Dec. 9, 2016) (noting that “Virginia’s 
prosecutors officially opposed the rule changes” and were relieved when the 
Virginia Supreme Court declined to adopt them) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 72.  See Doucette, supra note 1, at 427 (providing Doucette’s rationale for 
disagreeing with “the Committee’s conclusion that a new subsection requiring 
the disclosure of exculpatory evidence should have been added to Rule 3A:11”). 
 73.  Id.   
 74. 372 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 75.  Doucette, supra note 1, at 427. 
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First, Brady does not require the discovery of exculpatory 
evidence before a guilty plea.76 Yet the vast majority of 
convictions today result from guilty pleas.77 (That is why our 
study focused on pre-plea discovery.) In other words, consistent 
with Brady, prosecutors may withhold exculpatory evidence, as 
long as the defendant eventually decides to plead guilty.78 While 
some may respond that a guilty plea indicates actual guilt and 
that need for exculpatory evidence is therefore irrelevant, we 
know that about 13% of official exonerations have occurred in 
cases where defendants pleaded guilty.79  
Second, Doucette fails to acknowledge the real possibility 
that prosecutors may not recognize a particular piece of evidence 
as exculpatory, or that they might take a different view of it than 
would a defense attorney—possibilities that many scholars and 
commentators have discussed at length.80 Indeed, Doucette’s own 
misinterpretations of our findings give weight to this concern. He 
reviews the same facts that we did, yet he gave those facts a very 
different interpretation. Similar divergences in interpretation are 
to be expected when prosecutors and defense attorneys review the 
same evidence in a criminal case. To avoid wrongful convictions, 
it is therefore important to give defense attorneys access even to 
facts that prosecutors themselves believe are incriminating. 
Finally, while Doucette assails our methodology for resting 
on a non-representative sample, he relies on little more than 
anecdote to support his own conclusion that open-file discovery is 
too costly and burdensome for prosecutors.81 As we discuss in the 
                                                                                                     
 76.  See Brady, 372 U.S. at 87; United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628–32 
(2002).  
 77.  See What Percentage of Felony Convictions Were the Result of a Guilty 
Plea?, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=qa&iid=405 (last updated Nov. 13, 2016) (last 
visited Dec. 9, 2016) (attributing 95% felony convictions to guilty pleas) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 78.  See Turner & Redlich, supra note 7, at 301, 308, 330 n.188 (discussing 
cases holding that disclosure of exculpatory information is not required before a 
guilty plea). 
 79.  See id. at 289 n.11 (“According to the National Registry of Exoneration, 
210 of the 1575 wrongful convictions involved a guilty plea.”).  
 80.  See id. at 300–01 nn.58–62 (reviewing some of the voluminous 
literature on this topic).  
 81.  See Doucette, supra note 1, at 429–31 (describing Doucette’s experience 
on the Virginia Supreme Court Special Committee). 
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article, seventeen states, including large jurisdictions such as 
Texas, Florida, and Ohio, have adopted some form of open-file 
discovery and have managed to deal with the issues of redactions 
and motions for protective orders.82 Since our article was 
published, another scholar conducted a quantitative study of 
open-file discovery in Texas and North Carolina and found that 
open-file in those two states did not lead to a decline in the 
number of charges filed per arrest or in reduced sentences.83 This 
finding suggests that open-file is not so burdensome as to 
interfere with prosecutors’ essential duties, contrary to Doucette’s 
anecdote.  
In New York, another state that is currently considering 
discovery reform, a New York State Bar Association task force 
relied heavily on a comparative study of discovery rules and 
practices (as well as on comments of practitioners from within 
New York) and, like Virginia’s Committee, recommended 
liberalizing discovery, while providing for protective orders to 
ensure witness safety.84 This conclusion is broadly consistent 
with our review of the experiences of Virginia and North Carolina 
prosecutors and defense attorneys.  
To conclude, we wholeheartedly agree with Baer that 
additional empirical work is necessary to test our findings in 
different settings and through different methods.85 Some scholars 
have already begun this work,86 and more is sure to come. But 
our results, based on comparing the responses of hundreds of 
practitioners from Virginia and North Carolina, stem from one of 
                                                                                                     
 82.  Turner & Redlich, supra note 7, at 304. 
 83.  See Ben Grunwald, The Fragile Promise of Open-File Discovery, 49 
CONN. L. REV. *1 (forthcoming) (manuscript at 5) (finding “relatively little 
evidence that defendants fared significantly better in terms of charging, plea 
bargaining, and sentencing . . . as a result of open-file”) (on file with authors).  
 84.  See N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL DISCOVERY, 
CRIMINAL DISCOVERY REFORM IN NEW YORK STATE 7–8 (2014), 
https://www.nysba.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=54572 (summarizing 
the Task Force’s five general recommendations for criminal discovery reform). 
The New York State Bar House of Delegates approved the report on January 30, 
2015. Id. 
 85.  See Baer, supra note 2, at 358. 
 86.  See, e.g., Grunwald, supra note 83 (using aggregate administrative data 
from North Carolina and Texas criminal cases to compare case processing before 
and after the adoption of open-file discovery in each of the two states). 
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the most comprehensive studies of pre-plea discovery practices to 
date. Our findings point to the same conclusion that both the 
New York State Bar Association Task Force on Criminal 
Discovery and the Virginia Supreme Court Special Committee on 
Criminal Discovery Rules reached. With proper regulation, states 
can minimize the logistical burdens and witness safety concerns 
of open-file, while ensuring greater fairness and transparency in 
the criminal process.   
 
